Opinion Analysis: Court rules on whether magistrate can weigh credibility at preliminary examination

People v. Anderson
Docket No. 155172

Trial Lawyer’s Takeaway: Magistrate can weigh credibility at preliminary examination and refuse to bind over if reasonable person could not reasonably believe defendant’s guilt.

In criminal cases, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination, where the prosecutor will attempt to convince a magistrate that there is probable cause to bind over the defendant for trial.  Under MCL 766.13, “the magistrate determines at the conclusion of the preliminary examination” whether probable cause exists.  Here, the magistrate dismissed the charges against Anderson because the prosecution’s sole witness lacked all credibility.  The question is whether the magistrate was permitted to weigh the credibility of the witness at the preliminary examination; and, if so, what standard he or she should have used to conduct such a weighing.

Chief Justice Markman wrote the unanimous opinion, which held that the magistrate can weigh witness’s credibility.  The Court concluded that the word “determine” in MCL 766.13 “communicates that the magistrate must exercise some judgment” in weighing the evidence at a preliminary examination.  Moreover, that the determination comes “at the conclusion of the preliminary examination,” “strongly suggests,” according to the Court, “that a magistrate must consider the totality of the evidence.”

Next, the Court turned to the proper standard when a magistrate weighs credibility.  In this case, the prosecutor argued that magistrates should only review credibility using the standard from People v. Lemmon, 456 Mich. 625 (1998), which governs a trial court’s review of evidence on motion for a new trial and says the trial court must accept all testimony as true so long as it was not deprived of all probative value, did not conflict with “indisputable facts,” and did not “def[y] physical realities.”  The Court rejected applying such a high standard because it would make “the adversarial nature of a preliminary examination . . . largely meaningless.”  In addition, the “widely disparate consequences” between ruling at a preliminary examination (when the prosecutor could just recharge the defendant later with new evidence) and a motion for a new trial (when the prosecution would have to litigate another full trial) warrant differing standards.

Therefore, the Court held that a magistrate may decline to bind over a defendant only if a witness’s lack of credibility (when considered with all of the other evidence) “would preclude a person of ordinary prudence and caution from conscientiously entertaining a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.”  The Court said this finding is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion.

The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, which affirmed the district court’s dismissal of charges against Anderson.

Full opinion here.