People v. Denson
Docket No. 152916
Trial Lawyer’s Takeaway: prosecution cannot merely recite a proper purpose for character evidence, must instead show the purpose is proper.
Denson was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder after fighting with Shamark Woodward, a teenage boy who was presumably dating Denson’s daughter. At trial, Denson and Woodward told conflicting stories about the altercation.
Woodward claimed that he and Denson’s daughter had been kissing when Denson burst into the daughter’s room and began attacking him. Woodward testified that Denson went downstairs, retrieved a knife, and then returned to begin slashing Woodward.
Denson, on the other hand, told an entirely different story. He stated that he was downstairs watching football with his two sons when he heard his daughter—whom he had thought was home alone—yell for someone to stop. Denson said he ran up the stairs, saw Woodward forcing himself upon Denson’s daughter, and then struck Woodward. Denson testified that Woodward then ran downstairs until Denson caught him in the kitchen. At this point, both men grabbed knives and a knife fight ensued. Eventually the fighting ceased and Woodward left.
At trial, Denson claimed self-defense. In response, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Denson’s prior conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. That conviction resulted from a confrontation over a drug debt. Denson had sought out someone who owed him drug money, had smashed the windows on the person’s car, and, once the person appeared on a nearby porch, Denson shot him.
Defense counsel objected to admission of the conviction as inadmissible character evidence in violation of 404(b), but the prosecution claimed it was offering the evidence to rebut the self-defense claim, rather than to show propensity. The Supreme Court held that Denson’s earlier conviction was probative of nothing other than character. The Court analyzed the case under the four Vandervliet factors: (1) that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose; (2) that the evidence is relevant; (3) that the evidence satisfies MRE 403; and (4) that the trial court, upon request, provided a limiting instruction.
The Court, when analyzing the second prong, held that the evidence was not probative of refuting a self-defense claim. The prosecution claimed it was admitting the evidence because it was so similar to the alleged attack in this case, but the Court said evidence may only be admitted for this purpose if the prior act showed a “striking similarity” with the offense charged. The Court stressed throughout the opinion that the prosecution may not merely recite a proper purpose to admit evidence around 404(b); rather, trial courts must ensure the true purpose is not character evidence “masquerading” as a proper purpose.
The Court held, for multiple reasons, that the prior act was not strikingly similar to the charged act. The Court said the prior act was a completely different situation, an unrelated victim, and involved a different motive. And the Court noted that the earlier act did not even involve self-defense. After finding error, the Court concluded that this error was not harmless and remanded for a new trial.
Justice Wilder filed a lone dissent, arguing that the error, if any, was harmless.
Full opinion here.