Trial Lawyer’s Takeaway: On harmless-error review, appellants must show that they likely would have prevailed.
Lyles was convicted of murder, but appealed the trial court’s denial of his request for an instruction informing the jury that his evidence of good character could create a reasonable doubt of his guilt. The issue in this appeal, however, is whether that error harmless.
Read MoreTrial Lawyer’s Takeaway: a criminal defendant must show prejudice to claim deprivation of counsel.
The question in Lewis was whether deprivation of counsel at the preliminary examination was a “structural error” or an error where the defendant must show prejudice in order to obtain a reversal. Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all critical stages of a prosecution.
Read MoreTrial Lawyer’s Takeaway: Legislature’s MMERP warnings sufficient to recover Medicaid benefits from beneficiaries’ estates dating back to July 2010.
The issue in these consolidated cases was whether Michigan’s Department of Health and Human Services could recover Medicaid benefits paid from the beneficiary’s estate. In 1993, Congress required states to execute programs to recover certain Medicaid benefits from beneficiaries’ estates. To that end, Michigan enacted the Michigan Medicaid Estate-Recovery Program. Michigan’s Medicaid application forms did not warn about MMERP when Rasmer initially applied for benefits in 2008. By the time Rasmer’s patient representative sought a redetermination in 2013, the form did include such a warning.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers Takeaway: there can be more than one proximate cause under GTLA immunity exception, but must be "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause."
Kersch Ray ran cross-country on Chelsea High School’s cross-country team, which was coached by Eric Swager. During an early morning practice, Swager told the runners to cross an intersection even though the crosswalk sign warned “Do Not Walk.” When the runners crossed the street, Ray was hit by a car and injured.
The GTLA generally makes government employees immune from suit, but the statute makes an exception for when the employee’s conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. The question is whether the statute’s phrase “the proximate cause” is different from a proximate cause.
Read MoreTrial Lawyer’s Takeaway: multiple felony-firearm convictions can arise from a single criminal incident.
MCL 750.227b(1) sets out mandatory sentencing if a person is convicted of multiple convictions of felony-firearm possession: 5 years for a second conviction and 10 years for a third conviction. Before Wilson’s felony-firearm conviction in this case, he had been convicted twice of felony-firearm, but these two convictions arose from the same criminal incident. Under the Court’s decision in People v. Stewart, 441 Mich. 89 (1992), Wilson argued that these prior felony-firearm convictions should only count as one for purposes of the statute because they arose from the same criminal incident.
Read MoreThe Court issued two cases regarding judicial misconduct.
Read MoreTrial Lawyer’s Takeaway: all sentencing guidelines are advisory; a sentence’s reasonableness is based on Milbourn proportionality.
Both cases involved sentencing in the aftermath of the Court’s decision in Lockridge, which made Michigan’s sentencing guidelines advisory. Justice McCormack wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Viviano, Bernstein, and Larsen.
Read MoreTrial Lawyer's Takeaway: you can be charged with OWI in your own driveway
The question in Rea is whether you can be charged with drunk driving under Michigan law when driving your own car in your own driveway.
Read MoreTrial Lawyer’s Takeaway: prosecution cannot merely recite a proper purpose for character evidence, must instead show the purpose is proper.
Denson was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. At trial, he claimed self-defense. In response, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Denson’s prior conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. That conviction resulted from a confrontation over a drug debt. Denson had sought out someone who owed him drug money, had smashed the windows on the person’s car, and, once the person appeared on a nearby porch, Denson shot him.
Defense counsel objected to admission of the conviction as inadmissible character evidence in violation of 404(b), but the prosecution claimed it was offering the evidence to rebut the self-defense claim, rather than to show propensity.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers' Bottom-line: State Boundary Commission cannot rule on validity of Act 425 agreements; municipalities may include zoning provisions in Act 425 agreement.
Two trusts and a corporation, TeriDee LLC, owned land in Clam Lake Township that was zoned for forest-recreational use. The landowners wanted to develop the land for commercial use instead. To that end, the landowners filed an annexation petition to transfer the land to Cadillac. Around the same time, Clam Lake and Haring Charter Township entered into an Act 425 agreement to transfer the land to Haring.
When the landowners’ annexation petition reached the State Boundary Commission, the Commission’s statutory duty was to determine whether an Act 425 Agreement was “in effect.” The Commission, in carrying out this duty, determined it had the authority to declare the Act 425 Agreement “invalid” (using a number of statutory criteria) as opposed to just determining whether the agreement was “in effect.”
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Any restriction of recipients by a charitable institution must be reasonably related to the organization’s legitimate charitable goals.
Baruch is a nonprofit corporation registered as a tax exempt for its operation of Stone Crest Assisted Living, an adult foster care facility. For the years 2010–2012, Baruch sought tax-exempt status for real and personal property taxes under MCL 211.7o and MCL 211.9. The Tax Tribunal held that Baruch failed to satisfy three of the six Wexford factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the tribunal’s judgment, but only regarding the third Wexford factor, which requires a charitable institution not to offer its charity on a discriminatory basis. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ determination of the third Wexford factor.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: When calculating limitations period for medical malpractice cases under the Revised Judicature Act, fractions of days are rounded to provide whole days of counting and thus more time.
Haksluoto went to the emergency room due to stomach pains. After a CT scan, a doctor at Mt. Clemens Regional Medical Center said the plaintiff was fine to return home. Ten days later, Haksluoto returned to the emergency room, and doctors determined that he needed immediate surgery. Haksluoto sued for medical malpractice for the misinterpretation of the original CT scan.
Two statutes determined when Haksluoto needed to bring his suit. Under MCL 600.5805(6), he had two years to file his medical malpractice claim, creating a deadline of December 26, 2013. In addition, the Revised Judicature Act (MCL 600.101 et seq.) requires a prospective medical-malpractice plaintiff to give 182-days notice to a potential defendant before filing a claim. The combined effect of the statutes is to create two-year limitations period, within which Haksluoto needed to serve his Notice of Intent (NOI) to start the 182-day clock. Then he had to wait 182 days before he could file his suit. While those 182 days are counting the statute of limitations is tolled. And once the 182 days pass, the counting of the statute of limitations resumes.
Haksluoto waited until the very last day of limitations period, December 26, 2013, to serve his NOI. This started the 182 days of tolling under Revised Judicature Act. If Haksluoto was considered to have filed his NOI on December 26, then he needed to file suit on June 26, 2014. But Haksluoto did not file his suit until June 27. The hospital filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the suit was time-barred. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
The panel held that MCR 1.108, which is the rule that determines the calculation of time, said the 182-day notice period began the day after Haksluoto served the NOI—meaning December 27, 2013—and expired on June 26, 2014. Because this meant that the NOI did not commence until after the two-year limitations had expired, the NOI could not have tolled that limitations period. The Court of Appeals wrote that its holding “means that a plaintiff who serves an NOI on the last day of the limitations period is legally incapable of filing a timely complaint and is, in effect, deadlocked from timely filing a suit.” The Court granted leave to appeal.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is never relevant to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
The Marist Fathers of Detroit operate two private, Catholic schools, Notre Dame Prep and Marist Academy, in Oakland County. Bettina Winkler attended the middle school for these two institutions, but was denied admission to the high school. She believed the school rejected her because she had dyslexia, a learning disability. She sued under MCL 37.1402, part of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act.
The Marist Fathers of Detroit moved for summary disposition, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the circuit of subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge to admissions decisions of a religious school. The Marist Fathers also argued that the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act did not apply to religious institutions. The circuit court denied the motion on both grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Dlaikan v. Roodbeen, 206 Mich App 591 (1994). The panel said that, under the First Amendment, civil courts cannot analyze the decisionmaking process of a religious institution regarding admission. As a result, the panel did not need to reach the question of whether the Act applies to religious schools. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Trial court cannot correct an invalid sentence sua sponte after judgment; instead, a party must move for resentencing.
In 2011, Comer pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct. Under MCL 750.520n and People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546 (2012), the trial judge should have imposed lifetime monitoring on the defendant, but the judge failed to do so. Even after a remand for resentencing due to incorrect scoring of offense variables, the trial court still did not impose lifetime monitoring.
The Michigan Department of Corrections wrote a letter to the trial court saying that the defendant’s sentence should have included lifetime monitoring; but the prosecution never moved for resentencing. The trial court then imposed life monitoring sua sponte. After a remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “the trial court was empowered to correct defendant’s invalid sentence without time limitation.” The Court granted leave to appeal.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers' Bottom Line: Removing goods from a car counts as using a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle" for the parked vehicle exception for PIP benefits.
Kemp hurt himself when removing items from his car. He sought no-fault benefits, but the insurance company moved for summary disposition, arguing that his injury didn’t arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked vehicle, he didn’t meet the parked vehicle exception, and his injury didn’t have a causal relationship to the vehicle. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The question was whether Kemp had created a genuine issue of material fact under the parked-motor-vehicle exception in MCL 500.3106(1)(b).
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: The scope of knock and talks is time sensitive. If consent to a search is not “sufficiently attenuated” from an unconstitutional search, then evidence must be suppressed.
In the two consolidated cases, the Kent Area Narcotics Enforcement Team made unscheduled visits to the defendants’ homes at 4:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. The families at both houses were asleep. After an initial conversation, the police officers read the defendants their Miranda rights. The defendants signed a consent form and consented to a search of their homes, where the police found marijuana butter and other marijuana products.
At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court held that it was a valid, voluntary search. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that the officers waited to be received before conducting their search. The Supreme Court then granted leave to appeal.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers' Bottom Line: Healthcare provider cannot sue no-fault insurer directly for unpaid medical expenses; it must sue the patient-insured instead.
Jack Stockford was injured in a car accident and received treatment at Covenant Medical Center. His medical expenses totaled $43,484.80. Covenant sent a bill for this amount to Stockford’s insurer, State Farm, who refused to pay. Stockford then sued State Farm for no-fault insurance benefits. They settled for $59,000. As a part of the settlement, Stockford released State Farm from liability for all allowable no-fault expenses, including medical bills and past claims.
Covenant sued State Farm in 2013 to receive payment for the billed medical expenses. State Farm answered Covenant’s complaint by citing the settlement and release. The circuit court granted State Farm summary disposition on the theory that Covenant’s claim was derivative of Stockford’s and thus extinguished by the release. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that State Farm’s liability to Covenant could not have been dismissed by State Farm’s settlement with Stockford because State Farm had received written notice of Covenant’s claim before the settlement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: OV 5 should be assessed for “significant psychological injury,” even if victim’s family has no intention of seeking medical treatment
Damian Jones shot and killed a man he suspected of stealing his girlfriend’s phone. Calloway served as the getaway driver and was convicted of second-degree murder on an aiding and abetting theory. He was sentenced to 20 to 50 years in prison.
The trial court scored fifteen points for OV 5, which asks whether a “serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim’s family.” The Court of Appeals reversed because there was no evidence that any member of the victim’s family required or intended to seek professional treatment. The Court granted leave to determine whether evidence of an intention to seek treatment is required to score fifteen points for OV 5.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Rule 411 does not apply to municipal electricity providers, and the no-switch rule applies only if the customer is presently already receiving electricity.
The Court granted to leave to consider overruling Great Wolf Lodge of Traverse City, LLC v Public Service Commision, 489 Mich 27 (2011). The Court also clarified the meaning of MCL 124.3, which outlines "the no-switch" rule.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: if statute counts from when claim accrued, it is a statute of limitations and can be tolled by fraudulent concealment; statute of repose cannot be tolled.
This case revolved around the company ePrize, which specialized in online sweepstakes and interactive promotions. The plaintiffs were former employees of ePrize, who had acquired ownership interests in the company. They said the defendant, founder of ePrize Joshua Linkner, had promised them that their ownership interests would never be diluted or subordinated.
The plaintiffs sued for various claims, including LLC member oppression, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, however, because the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court took the case to determine whether the statute was one of limitations or repose.
Read MoreThis blog does not constitute legal advice. If you need legal advice, please consult a lawyer.