Trial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Rule 411 does not apply to municipal electricity providers, and the no-switch rule applies only if the customer is presently already receiving electricity.
The Court granted to leave to consider overruling Great Wolf Lodge of Traverse City, LLC v Public Service Commision, 489 Mich 27 (2011). The Court also clarified the meaning of MCL 124.3, which outlines "the no-switch" rule.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: if statute counts from when claim accrued, it is a statute of limitations and can be tolled by fraudulent concealment; statute of repose cannot be tolled.
This case revolved around the company ePrize, which specialized in online sweepstakes and interactive promotions. The plaintiffs were former employees of ePrize, who had acquired ownership interests in the company. They said the defendant, founder of ePrize Joshua Linkner, had promised them that their ownership interests would never be diluted or subordinated.
The plaintiffs sued for various claims, including LLC member oppression, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, however, because the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court took the case to determine whether the statute was one of limitations or repose.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Requesting penalty interest under the UPTA for insurer’s delay to pay UIM benefits is not subject to “reasonably in dispute” standard.
In 2004, the George and Thelma Nickola were injured in a car accident by another driver, Roy Smith, who was insured by Progressive. Smith’s policy did not cover the cost of the Nickolas' injuries, so they sought Underinsured Motorist Benefits from their insurance company. The insurance company refused, but after years of procedural wrangling, an arbitration panel awarded the Nickolas their UIM benefits.
The Nickolas then sought penalty interest under the Uniform Trade Practices Act (UTPA), MCL 500.2001 et seq. But the trial court refused to apply penalty interest because the claim was not "reasonably in dispute." The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that this language did not apply the Nickolas' claim.
Read MoreTrial-lawyers’ bottom line: For-profit schools are eligible for tax exemption under MCL 211.9(1).
SBC Health Midwest ran Sanford-Brown College Grand Rapids, a for-profit school located (oddly) in Kentwood, Michigan. SBC requested a tax exemption for the school under MCL 211.9(1). The City of Kentwood denied it. SBC appealed the decision to the Michigan Tax Tribunal, which also denied the exemption, holding that the statute provides an exemption for nonprofit schools only. SBC appealed again, finally winning in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the tax tribunal’s decision. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal; the question was whether a for-profit school could avail itself of the property exemption in MCL 211.9(1)(a).
Read MoreTrial-lawyers’ bottom line: A 3rd party can toll the no-fault act’s one-year limitations period by providing notice to a claimant’s insurance company.
Perkovic crashed his semi-truck in Nebraska on February 28, 2009. He was taken to the Nebraska Medical Center for treatment. The hospital sent a bill to his employer’s insurance company, Zurich American Insurance, who denied payment and returned the bill to the hospital.
Three months later, Perkovic filed a claim for insurance benefits with his personal insurer--not Zurich--under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. He failed to amend his complaint to add Zurich until March 25, 2010, after the one-year statute of limitations (MCL 500.3145(1)) had expired. As a result, Zurich moved for summary disposition. Perkovic argued that the hospital’s bill tolled the limitations period under the statute because the bill gave Zurich notice of Perkovic's claim. The trial court disagreed and granted Zurich summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The no-fault act creates an exception to the one-year limitations period if “written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident.” MCL 500.3145(1). The statute continues: “The notice of injury required by this subsection may be given to the insurer . . . by a person claiming to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in his behalf.” Id. The question was whether the hospital constituted “someone in [Perkovic’s] behalf.”
Read MoreHelen Yono stepped into a pothole and broke her ankle when she approached her car, which was parked in a parallel parking lane on M-22 in Suttons Bay. She sued the state for failure to maintain the road in a reasonably safe condition. The state claimed governmental immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, MCL 691.1407(1), which grants immunity to any governmental agency “engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”
There is one exception to this immunity, however, and that is the (familiar to many attorneys) “highway exception.” The Legislature codified the highway exception in MCL 691.1402(1) by stating that the agency responsible for highways “shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” But what the Legislature giveth, the Legislature taketh away: the statute goes on to say that the highway exception “extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” And this brings us to Ms. Yono’s case. Was the parallel parking line—a very common road design in smaller Michigan towns—part of “the highway designed for vehicular travel”?
Trial-Lawyers’ Bottom Line: Governmental immunity extends to parallel parking lanes, so the municipality is not liable for failing to maintain that portion of the road.
Read MoreTwo parties each claimed breach of a construction contract. The construction company claimed a construction lien for over $600K. At arbitration, the arbitrator awarded the construction company that amount, but also awarded the purchaser $185K. The purchaser paid the amount in full, which the construction company accepted.
The Construction Lien Act (CLA), MCL 570.1118, grants a court discretion to award attorney’s fees to “a lien claimant who is the prevailing party” in “an action to enforce a construction lien through foreclosure.” The question is whether the construction company “prevail[ed]” when it won on a breach of contract claim and accepted a full payment mandated by an arbitrator.
Trial-Lawyers’ Bottom Line: A company can prevail in an action to enforce a construction lien through foreclosure, even if it doesn’t win on the construction lien claim.
Read MoreTrial Lawyers’ Bottom Line: The statute, MCL 380.1230b, completely immunizes a school from having its required disclosures entered as evidence against the school in any action.Read More
The Michigan Supreme Court is the first court to use corpus linguistics.Read More
Trial Lawyers' Bottom Line: Forgery requires specific intent; signing another's name on an election petition does not.Read More
This blog does not constitute legal advice. If you need legal advice, please consult a lawyer.