Perkovic v. Zurich American Insurance Company
Docket No. 152484
Trial-lawyers’ bottom line: A 3rd party can toll the no-fault act’s one-year limitations period by providing notice to a claimant’s insurance company.
Perkovic crashed his semi-truck in Nebraska on February 28, 2009. He was taken to the Nebraska Medical Center for treatment. The hospital sent a bill to his employer’s insurance company, Zurich American Insurance, who denied payment and returned the bill to the hospital.
Three months later, Perkovic filed a claim for insurance benefits with his personal insurer--not Zurich--under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. He failed to amend his complaint to add Zurich until March 25, 2010, after the one-year statute of limitations (MCL 500.3145(1)) had expired. As a result, Zurich moved for summary disposition. Perkovic argued that the hospital’s bill tolled the limitations period under the statute because the bill gave Zurich notice of Perkovic's claim. The trial court disagreed and granted Zurich summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The no-fault act creates an exception to the one-year limitations period if “written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident.” MCL 500.3145(1). The statute continues: “The notice of injury required by this subsection may be given to the insurer . . . by a person claiming to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in his behalf.” Id. The question was whether the hospital constituted “someone in [Perkovic’s] behalf.”
Justice Bernstein, writing for the majority, held that it did. The Court dismissed the Court of Appeals’ purposivist opinion and looked at the statute’s text alone. The Court cited Black’s Law Dictionary to determine that “in his behalf” means “in the interest, support, or defense of.” In contrast, if the statute said “on his behalf,” the statute may have required an agency relationship between Perkovic and the hospital. But the Legislature did use “in,” not “on.” As a result, the Court’s interpretation meant that the statute did not require Perkovic to know that the hospital provided notice to the insurer for the notice to be effective.
Justice Young dissented, holding that the statute required Perkovic to be actively claiming benefits when providing notice because the statute says notice “may be given to the insurer by a person claiming” benefits. Justice Young believed this created a temporal requirement. The majority believed that the Legislature’s use of “may” was merely permissive, but Justice Young believe the word created a requirement in the context of the statute.
In sum, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the lower court’s search for the statute’s purpose. Both opinions looked to the text only and both resorted to the canons of statutory interpretation to reach their conclusions. Ultimately, the Court held that the hospital fulfilled the notice requirements on Perkovic’s behalf and thus tolled the statute’s limitations period.
Full opinion here.