Trial Lawyers Takeaway: there can be more than one proximate cause under GTLA immunity exception, but must be "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause."
Kersch Ray ran cross-country on Chelsea High School’s cross-country team, which was coached by Eric Swager. During an early morning practice, Swager told the runners to cross an intersection even though the crosswalk sign warned “Do Not Walk.” When the runners crossed the street, Ray was hit by a car and injured.
The GTLA generally makes government employees immune from suit, but the statute makes an exception for when the employee’s conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. The question is whether the statute’s phrase “the proximate cause” is different from a proximate cause.
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Trial-lawyers’ bottom line: A 3rd party can toll the no-fault act’s one-year limitations period by providing notice to a claimant’s insurance company.
Perkovic crashed his semi-truck in Nebraska on February 28, 2009. He was taken to the Nebraska Medical Center for treatment. The hospital sent a bill to his employer’s insurance company, Zurich American Insurance, who denied payment and returned the bill to the hospital.
Three months later, Perkovic filed a claim for insurance benefits with his personal insurer--not Zurich--under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. He failed to amend his complaint to add Zurich until March 25, 2010, after the one-year statute of limitations (MCL 500.3145(1)) had expired. As a result, Zurich moved for summary disposition. Perkovic argued that the hospital’s bill tolled the limitations period under the statute because the bill gave Zurich notice of Perkovic's claim. The trial court disagreed and granted Zurich summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The no-fault act creates an exception to the one-year limitations period if “written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident.” MCL 500.3145(1). The statute continues: “The notice of injury required by this subsection may be given to the insurer . . . by a person claiming to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in his behalf.” Id. The question was whether the hospital constituted “someone in [Perkovic’s] behalf.”
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