Ray v. Swager
Docket No. 15273
Trial Lawyer's Takeaway: there can be more than one proximate cause under GTLA immunity exception, but must be "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause."
Kersch Ray ran cross-country on Chelsea High School’s cross-country team, which was coached by Eric Swager. During an early morning practice, Swager told the runners to cross an intersection even though the crosswalk sign warned “Do Not Walk.” When the runners crossed the street, Ray was hit by a car and injured.
The GTLA generally makes government employees immune from suit, but the statute makes an exception for when the employee’s conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. The question is whether the statute’s phrase “the proximate cause” is different from a proximate cause. The Court of Appeals held that Swager’s actions were not “the most proximate cause,” which was instead being struck by a vehicle.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Viviano and joined by McCormack, Bernstein, and Larsen, reversed, clarifying that the GTLA is merely describing regular causation, which consists of cause-in-fact (also called factual causation or but-for causation) and proximate cause (which the Court calls legal causation). The majority said the use of the phrase “the proximate cause” in the statute did not change this normal meaning. The Court described its test for proximate cause in the context of GTLA, stating that one “must determine whether the defendant’s conduct was the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury.” But first, a court must determine whether the government employee’s gross negligence is the cause-in-fact before moving to a proximate cause analysis.
The opinion then analyzed some of the Court’s older opinions, where the majority said the Court seems to have erroneously used the term proximate causation to describe cause-in-fact causation. For example, the Court overruled its decision in Dean v. Childs, 474 Mich. 914 (2005), which held that a firefighter was not the proximate cause when his gross negligence led to the deaths of multiple children in a house fire.
The Court described a number of errors by the Court of Appeals, including that the panel needed to determine whether Swager’s actions were “the proximate cause,” which requires considering whether his direction to cross the street was “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of Ray’s injuries. In sum, the analysis proceeds in this order under the GTLA: (1) whether Swager was grossly negligent; (2) if so, whether his gross negligence the cause-in-fact (or but-for cause) of the injury; (3) if so, whether his negligence was a proximate cause of the injury; (4) if so, whether the proximate causation was “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury.”
Justice Wilder issued a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Markman and Justice Zahra. Wilder believed the statute’s use of the phrase “the proximate cause,” demonstrated “an intent to focus on one cause.” Applying its test, the dissent would have affirmed because Swager was not “the proximate cause” of Ray’s injuries.
Full opinion here.