Millar v. Construction Code Authority
Docket No. 154437
Trial Lawyers Takeaway: An employer's action, not its decision, triggers the 90-day limitations period to bring a claim under Michigan's Whistleblower's Protection Act.
Millar performed mechanical and plumbing inspections for the Construction Code Authority, a government agency. Two of the municipalities who utilized the Authority for inspections asked the Authority to stop sending Millar as an inspector. A little over two weeks later, the Authority drafted a letter to Millar, ordering him to do not further work in those municipalities. But it was not until the next week that the Authority actually delivered the letter to Millar.
Millar sought to bring a Whistleblower claim, arguing that he was fired because he had honestly reported violations of the building codes by the municipalities. The question before the Court was what event actually triggered the 90-day limitations period to bring a Whistleblower claim under Michigan’s Whistleblower’s Protection Act (MCL 15.361 et seq.).
The Court, in another unanimous opinion by Justice McCormack, held that the limitations period did not begin to run until Millar received the letter, which prevented him from inspecting one of the two complaining municipalities that day. The Court said it was irrelevant when the letter was written, because that merely showed the Authority’s intent to limit Millar’s inspection responsibilities. “It was not until that intent was effectuated . . . that the actionable ‘wrong’ occurred and triggered the running of the” limitations period.
“In other words,” the Court wrote, “in order for an actionable wrong under the WPA to have occurred, an employer must have done more than simply make a decision to discriminate against an employee.” Rather, the employer “must have taken an adverse employment action against the plaintiff.”
Notably, however, the Court did not reach the trickier question of whether the delivery of the letter was enough to trigger the limitations period because the Authority delivered the letter to Millar on the same day that the Authority prevented Millar from inspecting one of the municipalities that was scheduled for that day. In a footnote, the Court stated that it “need not address whether the communication of the adverse decision . . . or some other action constituted the triggering act.”
Justice Clement took no part in the case.
Full opinion here.